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Abstract—We study the problem of jamming in multiple
independent Gaussian channels as a zero-sum game. We show
that in the unique Nash equilibrium of the game the best-
response strategy of the transmitter is the waterfilling to the
sum of the jamming and the noise power in each channel and
the best-response strategy of the jammer is the waterfilling only
to the noise power.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the fundamental problems in reliability of wireless
communications is the problem of jamming. This refers to
the existence of a malicious user, the jammer, which tries to
compromise or destroy the performance of the wireless link.
We can view the problem of jamming as a non-cooperative
game [7]. Several studies in the past studied this problem as
a two-player game between the transmitter and the jammer.
In particular, in [1] Eitan Altman et al. considered a non
zero-sum non-cooperative game taking into account the trans-
mission cost. More specifically, in this work the transmitter
wants to maximize her own rate and the jammer wants
to minimize the rate of the transmitter taking into account
their transmission costs. The result of that work is the proof
of the existence and the characterization of a unique Nash
equilibrium and also an algorithm to compute it. In [5], the
author studied the problem as a zero-sum game using as utility
of the transmitter the linearized Shannon capacity. In [2], the
authors studied the problem in the case of multiple jammers.
In [6] the authors studied the jamming problem of Gaussian
MIMO channels as a zero-sum game.
Inspired by the work of [1], we study the problem of
jamming as a zero-sum game, with one transmitter and one
jammer over multiple independent Gaussian channels with
perfect channel state information (CSI). Our scenario is a
special case of the model in [1] when the transmission costs
are zero and their results can be applied in our scenario as a
subcase of their general model. Nevertheless, we believe that
this scenario is of practical interest and in our work we analyze
it in more detail with different and simpler tools giving
simple and intuitively satisfying insights into the problem. In
particular, we show that in the Nash equilibrium of the game
the best-response strategy of the transmitter is the waterfilling
taking into account the sum of the jamming plus noise power
in each channel, and the best-response strategy of the jammer
is the waterfilling taking into account the noise power only.
II. THE MODEL
We consider the Gaussian channel, with one pair of
transmitter-receiver and one malicious user, the jammer. There
are M > 0 independent channels that the transmitter can
use to transmit her information. In particular, the transmitter
has a positive budget of transmission power T and wants to
distribute it on the channels in a way that maximizes her
aggregate rate. Let the non-negative Tk be the portion of the
power T that is used in the channel k, with
M∑
k=1
Tk = T . In the
absence of a jammer her optimum strategy is the well known
waterfilling strategy with respect to the channel’s noise. On the
other hand, the jammer has a positive budget of transmission
power J and wants to distribute it on the channels in a way
that minimizes the aggregate rate of the transmitter. Let the
non-negative Jk be the portion of the power J that is used
in the channel k, with
M∑
k=1
Jk = J . Let αT > 0 be the
channel attenuation for the transmitter-receiver pair equal for
all channels and let αJ > 0 be the channel attenuation for
the jammer-receiver pair also equal for all channels. Also, let
Nk > 0 be the power of the additive Gaussian white noise
(AGWN) in the channel k. The receiver treats the signal of
the jammer as noise, so by the Shannon’s formula [8], [4] the
rate/utility of the transmitter in nats per channel use is:
uT = RT =
1
2
M∑
k=1
ln
(
1 +
αTTk
αJJk +Nk
)
,
which must be maximized.
On the other hand, the utility of the jammer is:
uJ = uT ,
which must be minimized.
We can consider the transmitter and the jammer as the play-
ers in a zero-sum game [7]. The strategies of the transmitter
are the constants Tk that are used to distribute her power on the
M channels and the strategies of the jammer are the constants
Jk that are used to distribute her power on the M channels.
Since, uT is concave in Tk and convex in Jk, we can apply
the Sion’s minimax Theorem to conclude that it has a saddle
point.
III. THE STRATEGY OF THE TRANSMITTER: WATERFILLING
We will analyse the best-response strategy of the transmitter
in the zero-sum game when the strategy of the jammer is
fixed, in other words the parameters Jk are fixed. We have
the following optimization problem:
max
Tk
1
2
M∑
k=1
ln
(
1 +
αTTk
αJJk +Nk
)
= max
Tk
1
2
M∑
k=1
ln (αJJk +Nk + αTTk)
−
1
2
M∑
k=1
ln (αJJk +Nk)
s.t.
M∑
k=1
Tk = T,
Tk ≥ 0, 1 ≤ k ≤M.
We can see that only 12
M∑
k=1
ln (αJJk +Nk + αTTk) depends
on Tk and therefore the solution of this convex optimiza-
tion problem is the well known waterfilling theorem of the
Information Theory (see page 245 of [3]) which states that
αTTk = (v − αJJk − Nk)
+, where v is calculated by the
expression
M∑
k=1
(v − αJJk − Nk)
+ = αTT . It is easy to see
that v > 0. If for some channel(s) j, αJJj + Nj ≥ v then
Tj = 0 and the transmitter will apply the waterfilling strategy
to the rest of the channels. This situation will arise only when
there is excessive noise in some channels, that is if Nj ≥ v,
since the jammer will avoid wasting power in a channel which
will not be used by the transmitter.
The waterfilling strategy of the transmitter maximizes her
rate for any strategy of the jammer including the best one
which minimizes this maximum.
IV. THE STRATEGY OF THE JAMMER
The best-response strategy of the jammer in the zero-sum
game if the strategy of the transmitter is fixed, that is if the
powers Tk have specific values, is determined by the following
optimization problem: Minimize uT , that is
min
Jk
1
2
M∑
k=1
ln
(
1 +
αTTk
αJJk +Nk
)
= min
Jk
1
2
M∑
k=1
ln (αTTk + αJJk +Nk)
−
1
2
M∑
k=1
ln (αJJk +Nk)
s.t.
M∑
k=1
Jk = J,
Jk ≥ 0, 1 ≤ k ≤M.
For the analysis, we use the KKT conditions. We use a
multiplier u for the equation
M∑
k=1
Jk = J and a multiplier
λk for any condition Jk ≥ 0. Thus, by the KKT conditions
we have, for any k, the condition
αJ
2(αTTk + αJJk +Nk)
−
αJ
2(αJJk +Nk)
+ u = λk, (1)
the complementarity slackness condition
λkJk = 0, (2)
and
λk ≥ 0.
From the KKT conditions when Jk is positive, so λk = 0,
must satisfy the condition 1/(αJJk+Nk)−1/(αTTk+αJJk+
Nk) =
2u
αJ
, where 2u
αJ
is a positive constant, since it is easy
to see that u > 0. Solving for Jk we find
Jk =
1
2αJ
[
− αTTk − 2Nk +
√
(αTTk)2 + 2
αJαTTk
u
]+
and u is calculated by inserting the Jks into equation
M∑
k=1
Jk =
J . We can see that Jk increases as Tk increases. Thus this
strategy of the jammer will convert an attractive (= less noisy)
channel in which the transmitter applies larger power, into a
less attractive (=more noisy) channel forcing the transmitter
to apply less power (assuming that she follows a waterfilling
strategy) and vice versa. This best-response strategy of the
jammer is also a mechanism which can be used to force the
behaviour of the transmitter in a manner that leads to the Nash
equilibrium of the game which is derived in the next section.
V. THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES
In this section, we will extend the previous results and ob-
servations to determine the strategies at the Nash equilibrium.
In the Nash equilibrium the transmitter plays a waterfilling
strategy by keeping constant the sum of her power, the power
of the jammer and the noise power in each channel. The strat-
egy of the jammer taking into account the optimal transmitter’s
strategy is determined by the minimax optimization problem,
that is
min
Jk
max
Tk
1
2
M∑
k=1
ln
(
1 +
αTTk
αJJk +Nk
)
= min
Jk
Transmitter plays
waterfilling
1
2
M∑
k=1
ln
(
1 +
αTTk
αJJk +Nk
)
= min
Jk
Transmitter plays
waterfilling
1
2
M∑
k=1
ln (αTTk + αJJk +Nk)
−
1
2
M∑
k=1
ln (αJJk +Nk)
s.t.
M∑
k=1
Jk = J,
Jk ≥ 0, 1 ≤ k ≤M.
The KKT conditions that we described in the previous
section must hold at the Nash equilibrium of the game. For
the analysis, we categorize the noise of a channel k into three
groups according to its power, Nk ≥ v, Nk ∈ (
vαJ
2uv+αJ
, v)
and Nk ≤
vαJ
2uv+αJ
.
By the waterfilling strategy of the transmitter as we analyse
in section III, if Nk ≥ v, then Tk = 0. Also, by the condition
(1) we can see that if Tk = 0, then λk > 0, so by (2) we
conclude that Jk = 0. Thus in the channels with excessive
noise both the transmitter and the jammer will avoid wasting
any power.
For Nk ∈ (
vαJ
2uv+αJ
, v), there are two cases for the jamming
power: αJJk ≥ v−Nk and αJJk < v−Nk. The first case can
not happen since then Tk = 0⇒ λk > 0 ⇒ Jk = 0, but this
is a contradiction. In the second case we have αTTk+αJJk+
Nk = v and λk > 0, since λk =
αJ
2v −
αJ
2(αJJk+Nk)
+ u ≥
αJ
2v −
αJ
2Nk
+ u > αJ2v −
(2uv+αJ )
2v + u = u− u = 0⇒ Jk = 0.
Thus the channels with Nk ∈ (
vαJ
2uv+αJ
, v) will be used by
the transmitter but not by the jammer since the noise is large
enough to make jamming inefficient and a waste of jamming
power.
For Nk ≤
vαJ
2uv+αJ
, the only possibility for the jamming
power is αJJk < v − Nk (for the same reason as above).
In this case we have αTTk + αJJk + Nk = v and λk = 0,
since the case λk > 0 ⇒ Jk = 0 leads to the contradiction
Nk >
vαJ
2uv+αJ
. Setting αTTk + αJJk +Nk = v and λk = 0
in (1) and solving for Jk we find that αJJk =
vαJ
αJ+2uv
−
Nk. The constant u can be found by solving the equation
M∑
k=1
( vαJ
αJ+2uv
− Nk)
+ = αJJ . The preceding analysis proves
that the strategy of the jammer in the Nash equilibrium is
also the waterfilling with respect to the noise power of the
channels.
In particular, if the powers of the transmitter and the jammer
are much larger than the noise power then the waterfilling
strategy of the jammer makes the combined jamming plus
noise power equal in all channels whereas the waterfilling
strategy of the transmitter results in the uniform distribution
of her power in all channels.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we study the problem of jamming in multiple
independent Gaussian channels. We derive the strategies of
the transmitter and the jammer on the unique Nash equilibrium
where the transmitter maximizes the minimum of her rate
and the jammer minimizes the maximum of the transmitter
rate. In particular, given that the waterfilling strategy of the
transmitter is known as the best strategy under interference,
our main contribution in this paper is to show that the
jammer’s optimum strategy in the Nash equilibrium is the
waterfilling to the noise of the channels as well.
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